

X-RZ 25-194

18 Apr 44

To : SI Registry, Washington  
Far East Section, SI, Washington

From: SI, Istanbul

Subject: Japanese Intelligence and Propaganda in Turkey  
Japanese News Service in Turkey

1. Enclosed herewith, for your information, are summaries on  
the above listed subject matters.

*Richard J. Munn*  
RCM/ns

enclosure:  
2 summaries

AM	11:44
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# NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2001, 2005

## EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐  
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒  
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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AHOOO No. 4, Feb. 12, 1944

Subject: Japanese Intelligence and Propaganda in Turkey

Source: Received by Director, ONI, Turkey, Jan. 14, 1944

Sub-source: AH350

Evaluation: Sub-source considered reliable.

Summary

Contains account of personnel and operations  
of Japanese Intelligence Service in Turkey.

Action: Forwarded for information only. It is understood that  
ONI has forwarded through its channels to Middle East  
and to War and Navy Departments.

Distribution: Copies to Saint, Washington, London, Cairo,  
XB, Istanbul

Transmitted by:

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Att 1 to XARZ-25194

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January 15, 1944.

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND PROPAGANDA IN TURKEY

A fact of significance about Istanbul is that it lies on the direct road as now followed between Berlin and Tokyo. From Istanbul eastward the road leads through Erzerum, Leninakan and Tiflis, to the Trans-Siberian. Average time in transit is about six weeks, Istanbul to Tokyo. The various Jap missions, delegations and experts pass through Turkey, stop for rest and entertainment, confer with Germany's American expert, Von Papen. The Germans, of course, cannot cross Russia and supposedly reach Japan by submarine.

Another fact of interest is that with the drying up of Lisbon as the best Jap observation post facing America and the occidental United Nations, Istanbul has become more important for Japanese watchers. It is not so good as Lisbon. But with Portugal's distaste for Japanese conquest neighboring the Portuguese colonies and with her closer collaboration with the Allies, Istanbul is one of the best alternative posts still in sight.

This is believed to account for the arrival here from Portugal about six weeks ago of Shin Ichi Chiba, former Japanese minister at Paris. His prolonged stay is given out as due to Russian slowness in granting a visa. Meanwhile, he is busy collecting information about the Near East and Turkey, and about the Americans. He formerly was a diplomat in the United States and is a specialist on America. He is considered important.

It should be recognized at the start that Japanese contact with the Turkish press is negligible, and that the job of Japanese newspaper correspondent is a mere cover for a secret intelligence agent.

Important Japanese personalities affecting information in Turkey and the Balkans include the following:

Mr. UCHIDA, First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, is chief of the Japanese information service for the whole of Europe, including Turkey. His assistant, Third Secretary in Berlin, was Mr. USHIBA who departed six weeks ago for Tokyo for a more important post in the Foreign Office and has not been replaced yet.

In Turkey the Acting Chief Information Officer is Horio AOKI, Third Secretary of the Embassy. Turkey had been a second-rate post for the

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Japs until the war. There were neither personal links of any importance or established political relations. They had no publicity. About twenty months ago Mr. AOKI started his work. He is charged with report-  
ing on the foreign policy of Turkey, on the United States, then England, the Middle East and India. He also maintains personal contacts with the Russians. He formerly held an important police post in South China and was in France before coming here. Negotiations for the settlement of the Indo China question with Vichy were conducted by him with such satisfaction to the Japanese Foreign Office that a cash grant of about \$5,000 was made to him. The gossip is that he spent the money to buy a bar in Paris and set up in business a French girl friend.

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A Turkey

Hideo HAKAO, another Embassy Secretary, is considered in Axis circles as one of their best-informed agents on the subject of Turkey. He is about sixty, has spent much time in Russia but for the past twenty years, approximately, he has lived in Turkey. He became a Moslem, took a Turkish wife and speaks the language perfectly. He has many Turkish friends. He is close-mouthed and keeps his knowledge for his reports.

Yoshio YAMAMOTO is the Japanese specialist on the United States and on India. He is very young and this is his second post, his first having been in Washington where he was interned after Pearl Harbor.

A Turkey

Tasutsugu GOTO, who is the more important, and Mr. SHIMIZU are the experts in Ankara on Russian affairs. Both have lived in Russia and speak the language.

For the collection of military information there is an expert in Ankara, Lt. Col. Umeichiro ODA, assistant military attache and liaison with Major Gen. Horio TATEISHI in Istanbul.

In charge of the Japanese information office in Istanbul is Kozo YZUMI. He is considered one of the best informed Japs on Russian affairs. He has spent many years in Russia as a consul and in other jobs. His wife is a Soviet Russian who now is working in Stockholm on a job similar to his. He speaks Russian perfectly. Before coming to Istanbul in May, 1943, he was First Secretary of Legation in Sofia and there he was on close terms with the Soviet Counsellor of Legation, Mr. OSSOUKIN.

Mr. ODA is the sole Japanese representative of the Domei Agency in Istanbul. He lives in Othangir and has his office in his house. He has a secretary, Karl FUNK, who acts as a translator for Turkish, French and German. A small quantity of news and pictures are received at the Japanese Embassy in Ankara and Mr. ODA sees to getting it out. It is sometimes distributed by German agencies, and assistance is given by

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a Turkish journalist who was secretary to <sup>H</sup>Mr. SASAKI, former Asahi correspondent here and now in Budapest.

In their propaganda the Japanese today are playing a double game, according to German opinion. (The Germans themselves keep a suspicious watch on the Japs and their liaison men also act somewhat as spies on them. In official dealings with the Germans, the Japs continue their talk of common victory. At the same time, the Germans are aware that wherever the Japs have diplomatic representatives, they try to influence men in military and high political circles in favor of their particular objectives, especially as concerns the Russians, regardless of their Axis partner.

German Ambassador Von PAPPEN is considered by the Japanese as definitely not their friend. The clinching fact to them was that he failed to send a note or otherwise make diplomatic compliments on the second anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. The Japanese Ambassador waited anxiously until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, then telephoned asking if he might call. Von PAPPEN, forgetting or ignoring the day, said: "I'm too busy now, call me back tomorrow."

Japs here have only the most formal relationships with the Russians, according to British reports. Protocol requires the Russians at times to invite Japs to parties, but they make circumstances pointedly uncomfortable for their guests. The Russians also make a practice of throwing difficulties in the path of Jap officials wishing to travel across Russia, and such travellers are accompanied by an armed escort. ITO, secretary to General TATEISHI remarked last week that it was only by bartering some rescued Russian seamen that they obtained transit visas for a party of seven officials. This, I believe was in November, 43.

Thus far the Japanese have not shown a great attention to what the Turks are doing or thinking. They put out little publicity here. Their whole press staff consists only of ODA. They make only the slightest contact with the journalists. On the other hand, they spend enormous sums, according to German insiders, for information. An example of that was Yamamoto KENJI, former correspondent here for Nichi Nichi. He was very active here in gathering information from travellers and for that the Turkish police expelled him to Sofia. He was extremely active here and his budget was reported as about 40,000 Swiss francs, monthly.

<sup>H</sup>Mr. VALIKOTNY, that most dubious Spanish "Press-attache", had six thousand Turkish pounds only for the start of a certain link with Iran.

<sup>H</sup>Mr. MAEDA now with the chief of staff of the Office in Tokyo, had an income of about five thousand Turkish pounds a month, when here in Turkey. He was Istanbul representative of Asahi Shimbun. Formerly he was in Rome.

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visited Ethiopia and helped mislead the people there in preparation for the Italian attack, for which service Italy decorated him. Recently these expenses have been lessened, but the Japs are still spending a maximum.

If they want a man, they must pay him more, than he gets anywhere else. For instance Mr. SHAMLIYAN was in the Europa Press service before he went over to the Japs. He had got some 250 TL a month. The Japs took him over, paying him about 800 TL a month. An average reported is making about 400-600 TL a month with the Japs. Mr. VALIKOTY's salary reached an average of 2,000-3,000 TL, when he was in Turkey. (This is only what he got from the Japs). Another Turkish informant, Mr. SEZIL, now confined in Anatolia, made about 1,200-1,500 TL a month.

Generally it can be said that there is virtually no limit on paying for the information that they get. Compared with the Germans, they still pay a maximum. A German first-rank journalist - or any other person in charge of matters of some importance - has an average income of between 1,500-2,500 TL, the expenses for propaganda and information purposes not included. As for this latter purposes, the German activities are ruled by the principle that it costs what it costs. This does not mean that they are wasting their money. It only means that, if some object has been found interesting and of value, the question of costs plays a very second part, money being always available. Not so with the Japs: They pay very often any amount demanded, only to get the business and keep it for themselves.

Mr. AOKI has probably through HAKAO, two or three very good links to the Turkish authorities, especially the Foreign Office. Apart from this he says he is getting press cables directly from India by his own correspondent. About the situation in Iran, Iraq and Syria he is mainly informed by an Iranian source in Beyrouth. (An Allied intelligence officer comments that he doubts the value of this Iran, Iraq and Syrian information, as well as of the press reports from India). Mr. JAHET from the Spanish Legation is in touch with him. About America he mainly is using the knowledge of some Turkish sources by HAKAO. Besides, he gets all the American, English and Middle-East papers available.

IZUMI has at his disposal the Armenian journalist SHAMLIYAN from Europa Press. Contact with different White Russian circles has also been established.

ENOMOTO the so-called Nichi Nichi correspondent has still a few links in this country. SHAMLIYAN is his man, only put at the disposal of Mr. IZUMI. Until Mr. VALIKOTY was dismissed and left the country, also he was directly depending on ENOMOTO. Also a Hungarian, named KOVACS, was working for ENOMOTO until he was expelled a couple of months ago. All

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these agents since they were expelled, still maintain their links from outside, either Sofia or Budapest.

The Office's branch in Bulgaria is headed by Mr. NOGUCHI, successor of IZUMI at the legation in Sofia. This branch has not only to deal with Bulgarian affairs, but has also to be prepared for the possibility that diplomatic relations between Japan and Turkey may be broken. In this case they have to continue work and must replace the organization in Turkey without delay. The agents in charge of this special duty are mainly the above-mentioned HIKUTO and Mr. UEDA.

HIKUTO is now working in Berlin, Budapest and Sofia. He has different Bulgarian and Hungarian agents. Besides, he has engaged VELIKOTNY, who is now in Budapest and will return to Sofia. VELIKOTNY also in Sofia now, is a member of the White Russian organization of Col. TURKU, who is still in Rome. VELIKOTNY is in regular touch with TURKU, getting material from him and giving this stuff to the Japs. As TURKU's organization is wide-spread, the material is not uninteresting. It is to be said, that the Japs are gathering information not only about their enemies, but also about their own allies quite cold-bloodedly.

UEDA's information is mostly based on his excellent Polish and Ukrainian relations in Eastern Europe. He is simply a spy. He was once a sort of press officer with the legation in Sofia and formerly was registered as correspondent for Asahi Shinbun as a cover. As for Turkey, he has a special agent named PEEV who is a Bulgarian journalist and visits Turkey from time to time.

Amongst the leading people of the Office in Berlin, the following are chiefly interested in South-eastern and Turkish affairs:

Mr. UCHIDA was already mentioned as chief.

Dr. KATO, Nichi-Nichi's European chief, is one of the leading men.

Dr. EJIMA, Domei's chief in Berlin, is using as a special agent a certain Dr. KUNI who is an interesting type of agent. He is a Japanese dancer and appears from time to time in the different capitals of Europe, always being charged with special duties which he covers by his profession. He is one of the most clever agents they have. He comes here.

Altogether they have in Berlin for the time being about 300 agents of the most different professions, whom they make use of as required for various information purposes.

The following analysis of Japanese information and propaganda is altogether from an official German source:

Although the Jap war-propaganda had been centralized already in 1941 under the direction of the so-called "Information Office" in Tokyo, it

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never has achieved really good results until now. This is probably due, above all, to the remarkable lack of adaptability of the Japanese character. Nevertheless the office has spread rather a close network all over the world and particularly in Europe. It must be pointed out that the methods employed by them differ from any western method. Whilst western propaganda will always try to influence a certain public opinion in a whole and to the utmost, the Japs apparently show a great publicity even in Germany, where the ground is most favorable for them. They consciously restrain their activities to a more selected circle of partners whom they think to be important for them. So, the Information Office has become practically an instrument of policy in aid of the official diplomacy. From this standpoint their work is not bad.

The office is charged with two rather different <sup>tasks</sup> duties: First: to gather information about the country concerned - and that means information of every kind - and second: to influence the leading or important circles of the country.

The first mentioned task brings the organization very close to espionage and, as a matter of fact, it is espionage. The second is secret diplomacy.

Therefore, the Information Office never appears in a foreign country officially under this name. The members are not to be known as members. On the contrary, they are usually employed as members of the diplomatic mission concerned.

Japanese information work in Turkey was launched on a larger scale in January, 1943 at a conference in Berlin between AOKI and UCHIDA. The problems discussed were: 1. putting their activities on a more important plane, 2. getting a certain publicity.

The organization listed above shows a considerable achievement as to the first point. It was decided, however, that no great importance be attached to publicity and that appears as a sound conclusion in view of the basic coldness of the Turkish press towards news from the Pacific. Their object remained the gathering of information and influencing select political circles. At that time and continuing until the Cairo and Teheran conferences of Allies leaders in December, 1943, their propaganda outline was about as follows:

The Japanese policy in Europe in the years 1942 and 1943 centered in the idea of bringing Russia and Germany to an arrangement or, if possible, even to an understanding. During the whole year of 1942 already they foresaw exactly the events we witness today. With all their influence they tried to convince the Germans. They several times offered themselves as intermediators. But already in January, 1943, a certain turn-point was apparently reached: Tokyo ordered secretly an inversion of

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propaganda. From then on they tried to get on better terms with Russians everywhere, also in Turkey. In August, 1943, Mr. AOKI reported to his Ambassador, when coming back from a conference in Berlin, that Germany has virtually lost the war, the outcome being only a question of time.

From this moment on, the office in Turkey is obviously following a quite new and different line: They hope that Russia finally will go too far with her demands in Europe, and, in doing so, will hurt after all the Anglo-Saxon's interests somewhere. They also have watched the development of General von Seydlitz's Free Germany Committee in Moscow very closely, because they hoped, that by the help of this committee Germany might be able to patch up a settlement with Russia and continue the war against the Western Powers. (This is stated by many conversations this writer had with the Japanese, even after the Moscow Conference). At any rate, the Japs do not believe that the Russians will keep any promises to the Allies. They still believe in the possibility of a perfect Russo-Japanese understanding relating to Chung-King, and in building up a mighty Asiatic bloc, overshadowing the whole of Europe. This is at least what they tell confidentially. Therefore they find today a closer coordination between the Japanese policy in Europe and Russia absolutely necessary. It was AOKI's idea that IZUMI should go on this purpose to Moscow to establish a regular link between the Japanese organizations in Russia and in Germany, which means, Europe as has not existed until now. This has not been decided, IZUMI not yet having received Ambassador OSHIMA's consent.

Since Cairo and Teheran the Japanese line has veered still further. Japan is informed that Chiang Kai Chek in Cairo asked if Russia could not be induced to help China in some way, and that STALIN at Teheran said no, not now, not until after the final defeat of Germany; but after that he might let the Americans use his air bases in Siberia or otherwise have help in fighting the Japs.

Accordingly, for the moment the Japs are watching Russian policy and trying to avoid occasions for friction. They have ceased trying to influence either Russia or Germany toward a mutual arrangement. They consider that a vain hope. They are convinced that Germany will lose the war against Russia. Their hope now is pinned onto Subsequent differences - Russia versus England and America. They hope that British and Americans may consider that Russia is going too far and demanding too much in Europe, may try to oppose her, in which case they wish to assure themselves of closer cooperation with Russia.

(Istanbul OWI comment on the foregoing -

If our German source has reported accurately, one of the most striking points is the story's spotlighting of the intensely self-centred, shifty,

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suspicious attitude of the Japs, their renunciation of faith in Germany as a permanently helpful ally, their willingness now to play ball with Germany's enemy Russia, their open-faced double-dealing, and on the other hand, the utter lack of confidence by the Germans in the Japs. This lends a particularly hollow note to German propaganda attempting to reassure their own people, their satellites and the world as to the great benefits they will get from their Japanese alliances. I should think our propaganda toward Germany and the satellites might profit from working on this inherent German suspicion and pointing out that their build-up of Jap strength is mere whistling to keep up their courage. The Germans have both reason and precedent to make them fearful of the double cross from Japan, and that inescapable fact should be useful to us in undermining their morale. Propaganda directed to the Germans emphasizing the duplicity and untrustworthiness of the Japs should be effective in increasing their sense of despair and hopelessness.)

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AH000 No. 5. Feb. 12, 1944

Subject: Japanese News Service in Turkey

Source: Received by Director, O/I, Turkey, Feb. 8 and turned over to AH001 in view of X-2 relations with source.

Sub-source: AH350

Evaluation: Sub-source considered reliable.

Summary

Presents data on personalities and propaganda program of the Japanese with respect to Balkans, Soviet Union and Middle East. Operations centering on Turkey.

Action: This report is going out through OMI channels also by pouch this date. O/I made translation but we have original hence OSS should make necessary distribution without delay as it is assumed that we have accepted this responsibility.

Distribution: Copies to Saint, Washington, London, Cairo, XB, Istanbul.

ATT #2 to XARZ - 25194

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Istanbul, 28.1.1944

Subject: Jap. ID in Turkey - Group AOKI-IZUMI

(H.D. = Nachrichten Dienst = News Service).

After Horio AOKI, as previously reported, through IZUMI'S assistance brought about a division of his information system his whole effort was directed to build up the apparatus on this new basis so that he could satisfy the demands of a much larger ID central in this important key position for Japan lying between Europe, Russia and the Anglo-Americans. This goal has not yet been achieved but important progress has been made. The steps taken toward news service are as follows:

- A) As our investigation already shows clearly, the Japanese central in Turkey wants to be extensively and above all speedily informed on all events inside Europe. This is necessary for them in the case of particular happenings in Europe to be able to compare these with the succeeding reactions in other countries and in this way obtain a fairly well rounded off picture of the world situation on at least the European-Asiatic situation. For details see below.
- B) The same applies to the Soviet Union. From there also the Japs want to be kept informed continuously in Turkey. Details see below.
- C) The third line of attack is the part of Asia designated by the Japs as the "Western Asiatic territory" which covers the geographic area known to us as "middle east". The interest is principally in Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf down to India. At the same time they do not entirely neglect the actual Mediterranean countries in this area but consider them of secondary importance aside from the specific individual problems. In the Mediterranean countries of this area the Jap ID concentrates particularly on: troop movements on a large scale, especially the movements of large masses of transportation. The official ID works in this connection parallel to the military ID but independently. Details follow later.

From the above it is evident that Turkey assumes a first class position in the policy of the Japanese ID on an organization and news basis.

Details of the above:

- A) European news arrives in the Istanbul branch and is worked on by IZUMI. They are differentiated as: Balkan Information arrive by courier or radio. Reports follow continuously by the technically

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speediest way. European news arrive from time to time in the form of combined situation reports. Transmission either by mouth or through special agents or in writing via normal courier. In the latter case they go right to Ambassador KURIMARA. The Balkan reports indirectly come through Jap. connections in the countries reported on who are, charged with these duties by IZUMI and the frame-work of the total organization. This special information service is supplemented by the following lines:

Homotaro KIKUCHI. Main residence Budapest, frequently at Berlin and Sofia.

Vladimiro VELIKOV. Main residence Budapest but also in Madrid, Paris, Sofia. Connections to German offices and the known White Organizations. Amongst others: TURKU-ROLAND, JORDANA-PARIS. Lately also KOHALSKI - Bucharest in competition with ULEDA as known.

MATOFF. Up to the present at Sofia. Press management, connections with army. Location unknown since Jan. 10th.

Boris DIMITROFF. Sofia, press management. Works at the same time for the Soviets with the knowledge of the Japanese.

DAROFF. Sofia, journalist. Location unknown since Jan. 10th.

BILANSKI. Budapest. Bulgarian military attache. *working with Japanese*

Dr. KATASSY. Budapest. Details still outstanding, not confirmed as certain.

KOVACS. present location unknown, probably Budapest. Formerly Turkey.

All the listed subsidiary connections are at the same time and mainly in the service of the local ND chief, but the reports go in the same form by courier to KIKUCHI who then uses them for his reports to IZUMI. This system was found to be too lengthy, circumstantial and therefore unsatisfactory. AOKI, therefore, urged the addition of a second man to help out KIKUCHI. This additional help seems to be KEIKITI OSHI. He formerly had a name in the sport world, has been living for five years in Germany and has been on a Balkan trip for several weeks to get acquainted with his territory; officially in order of "Tokio Nichi-Nichi". From the beginning of January until the 28th he was in Istanbul where he was introduced into the requirements of the Balkan information service and IZUMI.

Yokikazu ODA. Presently still in Istanbul with the intention eventually to move to Budapest. Informant in Sofia: DRAHNEFF, Sofia, journalist, with the connections since January 10th, present location unknown. In-

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formant in Budapest was released December 1943. Successor not appointed yet, possibly OMO or SHINIZU, both still in Rome.

The main duty of ODA, however, is to get information and work on special questions in his territory in the course of frequent trips in the Balkans including Budapest.

In addition to courier information IZUMI on special cases receives by way of radio the necessary information from the local HD chief. For instance with regard to the effects of the bombardment of Sofia on January 10th details were received from IZUMI a few hours after the first bombing, while otherwise any kind of information was lacking.

The following could also be found out about the work of the official HD of the European south-east and east: (1) In Budapest there is an active use of Polish informants who have their headquarters in the Erzsébet-korut in Budapest. These connections work under the General Government via Pressburg. In setting up and developing these connections, a Japanese diplomat named SHINIZU was active, his identity is not established as his name is frequent in the Japanese language.

(2) A surprisingly large information system comes together in Pressburg. It is in the hands of OKIYAMA-PRESSBURG; it works particularly in the G.C. - the Protectorate. The leading members are YAMAGUCHI - Vienna and the representative of "KITSUI" in Prague; name uncertain.

(3) The reports available in the HD Central Turkey on Rumania are surprisingly weak. This is mainly due to the fact that Rumania is reserved to UEDA who due to well-known competitive reasons shuts off reports to IZUMI. But after UEDA left Sofia somewhat hastily Jan. 10 in order to remain in Bucharest, AOKI figures he can obtain his cooperation as the competition with SHIMOTO is automatically weakened. Up to the present AOKI resp. IZUMI were almost exclusively independent on the occasional reports of ODA as to information obtainable about Rumania from diplomatic sources.

B) With regard to operations about the Soviet Union the following details were noted: (1) In Ankara the personal contact of AOKI with the Soviet Ambassador has again increased substantially as these had been certain weakening during the period of Moscow and Teheran conferences. The contact mentioned is restricted, as far as can be established, to formal invitations on the part of the Soviets to social receptions and to one-sided requests for meetings by AOKI to the Soviet Embassy. To the Axis partners AOKI declares his visits are due to about 60 requests for transit visas through the Union. Extreme secrecy is maintained on details of the talks by AOKI and his co-workers.

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In Istanbul it has been ascertained that IZAKI in his apartment: Istanbul - Hisantas, Enlak Caddesi, 13/3, carries on secret meetings with Russian elements. Surveillance reports more or less regular meetings with at least four people of which one is reputedly identical with a White Russian named GORSCHENIN (report being checked). Two others cannot be identified. It has only been determined that they speak Russian between them. The fourth finally in the course of the last two months was recognized twice when entering the Soviet Trade Bank in Istanbul, Istiklal Caddesi. The determination of his name is still expected. His visits to IZAKI are irregular, three times during the period from the 1st to the 15th December 1943. Duration of visit 15 minutes to an hour. Description: About 45 years old, appearance not striking; dark, small moustache; dark accentuated, almond shaped eyes, slim figure, height about 1.75. Caucasian type.

2) An effort to set up regular connection between the Japanese Embassy in Ankara and that in Moscow continues (see our previous report). As can be recalled, AKI suggested to UCHIDA - Berlin - a trip of IZAKI to Moscow to find ways and means of establishing closer cooperation between the Japanese Embassy of Moscow and that in Berlin via the Embassy in Ankara. This proposal at that time was rejected by UCHIDA in order not to endanger Japanese-Russian relations. The Soviets refused as before to permit any courier connection of any kind between Moscow and Ankara direct. Also a regular telegram transmission through the Embassy between Moscow and Ankara direct is impossible.

As far as can be determined here the diplomatic connections of AKI and his efforts around the Soviet diplomats in Ankara are serving to find out a way to make possible the desired connection between the Japanese Embassy in Moscow officially and with the knowledge of the Soviets.

As this effort, however, has been unsuccessful up to the present, AKI is also trying to obtain unofficial contact with another personality in Moscow who has means of transmitting information to Ankara and it would also be useful in other ways. The personality in question does seem suited for this purpose. The preparations in process, however, are of very delicate nature and it is not practical to report on it before the matter is settled.

C) Will follow shortly with the next courier, also an explanation of the activity of ministers CHIRIA and TAJABE.

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Subject: Continuation of Report of January 28.

Referring to point C:

Of the previous report the working of the "Western Asiatic territory" and India was taken away from Istanbul by AKHI on purpose and is now exclusively directed from Ankara. Certain technical assistance which is still required in Istanbul (it is a matter of single talks regarding meetings and so forth) is taken care of by Y. AKHI. The latter is Chancellor of the local branch of the Embassy.

The main effort in setting up connections in this territory is placed on HAKAO who is a Moslem married to a Turk, has good Moslem connections and has been very active in the Irakian-Iranian sector.

The questions dealt with primarily by the Civil MD in this area are:

- 1) Raw material production of the Anglo-Americans especially oil. Technical extensions for oil production and oil transport.
- 2) Road and transportation conditions.
- 3) Ship movements in the Persian gulf.
- 4) Activities of Arab or other native groups against the Anglo-Americans, or political and economic conditions to create such groups.
- 5) Development of the Soviet positions in the sector, successes of the Soviets, communistic questions, etc.
- 6) Political reports from India.

With regard to these points, following is to be noted:

Only questions 1/3 are of acute interest to the Civil MD and information on them is therefore sought for with corresponding means. Questions 4/6 are worked on just as seriously but with definite signs that they are long-term operations.

The connections established in the "West Asiatic Territory" to answer all 6 questions are:

- 1) A fixed Iranian connection, Hasen STEHWANI, in Beyrouth with further connections in Baghdad and Teheran. Transmission of reports is over a certain courier of the Iranians not known to us. Delivers primarily material on the oil question from Irak and Iran and on road and transportation conditions.

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- 2) An occasional Afghan connection bringing material from Waziristan and the north-western provinces.
- 3) A regular Polish connection from the Miski circle. Supplies information on Soviet operations in the Middle East.
- 4) The connection in New Delhi previously reported on political information. The India work is to be intensified from now on. To cover this sector the Indian specialist recently arrived in Ankara, TANABE, is to be used.
- 5) The movements from the Persian gulf, especially Basrah: The connection was originally KOVACS known, experienced and directed. But since his expulsion from Turkey the connection has only been carried on with great effort and entirely severed for 6 weeks. A new connection has been worked on.
- 6) The previously described, fairly extensive Armenian network, including primarily SHALTI and connections is now apparently being dropped as SHALTI has no longer the confidence of the Japs. This network finally was covering Syria as well as Irik and English occupied Iran. Details regarding SHALTI are available at ALI.

Outside of the three previously described sectors A, B, and C, it is obviously to be noted that the entire Civil MD is active against Turkey and the Anglo-Americans without differentiation.

Regarding Turkey all possibilities are used to obtain information. With regard to activities against the Anglo-Americans the following is to be noted: The civil MD concentrates in this connection exclusively on determining political and military political events in the widest sense of the word. Although we had in our own interest directed particular attention to this point, we had to recognize that the civil MD is only superficially informed on direct, actual, military events which occur for example in Cairo or Palestine. This line of activity is apparently left to the organization of TATAISHIZ and MATSUHARA. An exception is the movement of the English commercial and war vessels in the eastern Mediterranean in so far as they lead to the conclusion that a larger movement of ship tonnage is taking place from the eastern Mediterranean to other scenes of activity. For this question these Armenian connections were used who, as previously reported were active in the same countries with similar questions for the Soviet interests (see our interim report of March 1943). Difficulties have recently occurred in this complex developments of which cannot be foreseen now. All that can be determined is that at least a large part of the 6 above named connections either have only been given up or will be given up. Detailed report follows when the situation is clearer.

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Aside from these details the Civil ND is working at high pressure on clearing up the inner American situation, in a political and economic, as well as military direction. The following questions are being dealt with: (

- 1) American production figures especially in airplanes and tonnage.
- 2) Progress in building up the army with possible details.
- 3) An exact observation of inner political events in the United States which could have a general effect on the conduct of the war or a special effect on Japan.

The direction of this information - work for which practically the entire forces of the civil ND in Turkey have been available, has been taken over recently by Minister CHIBA. He was formerly Ambassador in Vichy. He is not officially accredited in Turkey but covers his stay here with the explanation that he is waiting for his transit visa through the Soviet Union. Statements of MORIO AOKI leave no doubt that every care has been taken that CHIBA will not get his transit visa for a long time. The Japanese say the minimum is 6 months.

The following facts have been determined with regard to CHIBA and his previous activity:

- 1) He was active in Vichy with the rank of Minister. After MORIO AOKI left Vichy, he took over his connections and continued them.
- 2) CHIBA is considered an expert particularly on the U.S.A. He worked on his connections from Vichy in one direction over Marseille and Spain to North Africa. On the other side through a group in Lisbon including the Domei representative SATO to South American and the U.S.A.

His appearance in Turkey surely is not equivalent to giving up the above named connections through the civil ND but it shows that the working conditions for the Japs in Lisbon and also in North Africa recently have become so difficult that the presence of CHIBA at this post did not pay. His transfer to Turkey indicates the attempt to build up Turkey as the information basis for the questions described above.

Regarding ODA: The former named in our report of January 28th has since been excluded from Turkey. Grounds: Espionage against Turkey, using agents from the circles of VELIKOTNY.

Details with ALL.

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